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Sociobiology and evolutionary psychology are related fields, 
both ofwhich claim that biology is the principal determinant 
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in human affairs. Sociobiology was initially, and by some ac-
counts is entirely, the study of the genetic bases of animal 
behavior. Sociobiologists regularly also attempt to explain ' 
human behavior. Sociobiology is, as the term suggests, the 
biology ofanimal andhuman society. Sociobiology preceded 
and developed into evolutionary psychology, which features 
mental dispositions more than genes as the evolutionary de-
terminants. The relationship of the two disciplines is both 
congenial and contested. 
Even more contested, by biologists, social scientists, and 
humanis'ts alike~ is how far either discipline succeeds. Edward 
O. Wilson, the founder of sociobiology, calls it a "new ho-
lism," even, with capitals, "the Modern 'Synthesis" (1975, 
pp. 7,.4). But critics see it as genetic reductionism. Evolu-
tionary psychologists claim that humans have what Jerome 
H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby call an "adapt-
ed mind," and call for a "conceptual integration" of all the 
diverse academic disciplines studying humans, their behav-
iors, minds, cultures under this biological "view of a single, 
universal panhuman design" (1992, pp. ~5). Critics see this 
too as biological imperialism. 
SOCIOLOBIOLOGY. Wilson opened his 1975 Sociobiology 
with auspicious claims: "Sociobiology is defined as the sys-
tematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior. It 
may not be to'o much to say that sociology and the other so-
cial sciences, as well as the humanities, are the last branches 
of biology waiting to be included in the Modern Synthesis" 
(p. 7). He concludes his massive study: "Scientists and hu-
manists should consider together the possibility that the time 
- has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the 
hands ofthe philosophers and biologicized" (p. 562). A quar-
ter centu.ry later, the "temporary" is becoming more perma-
nent. Only in a biologically based "consilience" is there any 
hop~ of "the unity of knowledge" (Wilson~ 1992). 
A frequent motif in the claims of both sociobiology and 
evoJ~tionary psychology is that the b~ic thrust of all life is 
"selfish." Richard Dawkins titles an influential book The 
Selfish Gene, and opens: "We are survival machines-robot 
vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish mole-
cules known"as genes" (1989, p. v). Philosophers, especially 
ethicists, object that biologists are labeling genes with a word 
borrowed from the cultural phenomenon of morality. A less 
pejorative theory could avoid reading back objectional fea-
tures from culture into nature, and avoid speaking as though 
animals and genes were ethical agents in conditions of only 
superficial similarity. 
Sociobiologists reply that the words selfish and altruistic 
as they use them in genetic biotogy have nothing to do with 
motivation, only with behavior. These replies are not always 
convincing, because Wilson does propose to "biologicize" 
ethics, and Dawkins does begin his Selfish Gene with the in-
junction: "Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because 
we are born selfish" (1989, p. 3). 
Critics of this selfishness at the root of sociobiology 
claim that there is, even in biology, more than one way of 
framing this behavior. After all, biologists claim thai organ-
isms are quite interrelated, living in communities, 'eco-
systems, ~ith' myriad so~ctions, cooperations, interdepen-
dencies. Genes are spread around; that IS the only way they 
cap be 'conserved. Organisms are selected for their capacities 
to leave more of their genes in the next generation, which, 
if it can be thought of as the survival of the "selfish," can as 
easily be thought of as the survival of the "senders." Organ-
isms are tested for their capacities to bequeath what they 
know genetically to their offspring. Sociobiology needs also 
to be about shared identity, kinship. William D. Hamilton 
in a founding paper develops the/idea of "inclusive fitness" 
(Hamilton, 1964). 
Biologists could be committing what Alfred North 
Whitehead called the fallacy of misplaced concreteness 
(Whitehead, 1967, p. 51). Selecting out one feature ofa situ-
ation, one forgets the degree ofabstraction involved from the 
real world,' and mistakenly portrays the whole by over-
enlarging a factor of only limited relevance. An even more 
insistent criticism is that sociobiology fails to recognize the 
novel, nonbiological dimensions of human culture. Culture 
"denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings em-
bodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions ex-
pressed in symbolic forms, by means ofwhich men commu-
nicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and 
attitudes toward life" (Geertz, 1973, p. 89). Although animal 
ethologists use the word culture in reference to animals with 
capacities for communication and imitated behaviors, cul-
ture in the sense ofideas passing from mind to mind is pecu-
liarly human. Humanlanguage is elevated remarkably above 
anything known in nonhuman nature; the capacities for 
symbolization, abstraction, grammar, vocabulary develop-
ment, teaching, literary expression, and argument are quite 
advanced. The determinants of animal and plant behavior 
ar~ never anthropological, political, economic, technological, 
scientific, philosophical, ethical, or religious. 
Humans have lived in cultures for perhaps a million 
years, reproducing across thousands of generations. There is 
every reason to expect that those humans will do best repro-
ductively who do best culturally, and, vice versa, that a geno-
type will be selected to produce a culturally congenial pheno-
type. But the question remains whether this emergence of 
culture introduces behaviors that, however much they con-
tinue to require biology, also transcend it with a distinctive 
human genius. 
Sociobiologists insist that biology is dominant in 
human culture. Wilson puts this in a bold, if somewhat 
loose, metaphor: "The genes hold culture on a leash. The 
leash is very long, but inevitably values will be constrained 
in accordance with their effects on the human gene pool" 
(1978, p. 167). This is "the general sociobiological view of 
human nature, namely that the most diagnostic features of 
human behavior evolved by natural selection and are today 
constrained throughout the species by particular sets of' 
genes" (1978, p. 43). Michael Ruse agrees: "1 argue that Dar-
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winian factors inform and infuse the whole ofhuman experi­
ence, most particularly our cultural dimension.... 
Human culture, meaning human thought and action, is in­
formed and structured by biological factors. Natural selec­
tion and adaptive advantage reach through to the very core 
of our being" (1986, pp. 140; 147). 
Earlier versions ofsociobiology supposed that the genet­
ic shaping of beliefs was rather direct and one way. In later 
versions, more attention is given to gene-culture coevolution. 
The genes are still in control, however; cultural variations are 
selected and persist only when the genes can use them the 
better to reproduce, although the detail of such innovative 
practices will be transmitted to the next generation culturally 
and nongenetically. ­
The genes build what is called an epigenetic mind. Epi­
genesis conveys the idea of a secondary genesis, ancillary to 
the primary genetic determinants, a sort ofepiphenomenon. 
Ruse and Wilson put it this way: "Human thinking is under 
the influence of 'epigenetic rules;' genetically based processes 
of development that predispose the individual to adopt one 
or a few forms of behaviours as opposed to others" (1986, 
p. 180). Humans- have innate mental dispositions, such as 
to avoid incest, or fear strangers. 
Critics reply that human beliefs can differ radically. The 
ancient Scythian nomads in southern Siberia believed that 
when their chieftains die they should bury their concubines 
with them, along with their horses and other necessities for 
the next life; modern Americans believe in women's rights, 
and doubt-that hors~ ought to be treated this way. Which 
of these beliefs one comes to hold depends more on one's ed­
ucation than on genes. If the new ideas are contagious 
enough culturally they can spread indefinitely through the 
population. 
Significant cultural changes can occur within a century, ' 
even a decade. Genetic changes can only be transmitted to 
offspring, which disseminate slowly through a population. 
Entire cultures rise and fall in less than a thousand years, the 
minimum period of time in which biologists estimate there 
might be significant changes in the genetic pool of a human 
population. The millenarian genes cannot track the ephem­
eral cultural changes. Individual persons can gain new infor­
mation constantly throughout a lifetime. Cultural practices 
get borrowed, traded, adapted; they intermingle across ge­
netic lines. When oral cultures evolve to become literate cul­
tures, people can transmit ideas to thousands who read books 
a thousand miles away or a thousand years later. This acceler­
ates the pace of cultural information transfer by orders of 
magnitude over that ofgenetic information transfer. It is dif­
ficult to yoke horses and jet planes in coevolution and have 
them travel anywhere together. 
Cultural options can operate without modifying the ge­
netics. In computer imagery, the same "hardware" ,(biology) 
supports diverse programs of "software" (culture). Socio­
biologists may reply that the hardware does limit what sorts 
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of software can run on it. Critics counter that the metaphor 
overlooks how the infant brain is synaptically unfinished and 
is to a considerable extent "wired up" during the child's edu­
cation into its culture. The evolved brain allows many sets 
of mind: one does not have to have Plato's genes to be a Pla­
tonist, Darwin's genes to be a Darwinian, or Jesus' genes to 
be a Christian. The system of inheritance of ideas is indepen­
dent of the system of inheritance of genes. 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY. Evolutionary psychology is a 
descendent of sociobiology, with more attention to mind 
and its cultural capacities, but retaining the underlying bio­
logical determinants. Jerome H. Barkow realizes that there 
is a "complex psychology" in humans, with genes and culture 
interacting, sometimes working together, sometimes pulling 
in opposite directions. Nevertheless, it remains basically cor­
rect "to speak of the genes anchoring the psychological pre­
dispositions that tend to pull our cultures back to fitness­
enhancing orbits" (Barkow, 1989, p. 8). 
Humans have what John T ooby and Leda Cosmides call 
an "adapted mind" made up of a set of "complex adapta­
tions" that, over our evolutionary history, have promoted 
survival (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, 1992, p. 69). These 
form a set of behavioral subroutines, selected fOf coping in 
culture, by which humans maximize their offspring. The 
mind is more like a Swiss army knife, with tools for this and 
that, rather than a general-purpose learning device. Humans 
have needed teachability, but they have also needed chan­
neled reaction patterns. The adapted mind evolved a com­
plex ofbehavior-disposition modules, each dedicated to task­
specific, survival-specific functions such as obeying parents, 
or being suspicious of strangers, or ostracizing noncoopera­
tors. In picking mates, men are disposed to select younger 
women, who are likely to be fertile. Women are disposed to 
select men of social status, who are likely to be good pro­
viders. 
Critics find that some more or less "automatic" behavior 
is desirable. Subroutines to which we are genetically inclined 
are shortcuts to survival, reliable mode.s of operating whether 
or not persons have made much rational reflection over these 
behaviors. Nevertheless, the mind is not overly compartmen­
talized, because behaviors interconnect. If women are prone 
to choose men of status, that requires considerable capacity 
to make judgments- about what counts as status economical­
ly, politically, and religiously. They will have to judge which 
one of their suitors, who often are still relatively young, is 
most likely to attain status in the decades of their child rear­
ing. Behavioral modules seem unlikely for the detail of such 
decisions under' changing cultural conditions. Capacities to 
select such a mate are perhaps somewhat "instinctive," but 
they are unlikely to be an adaptive mechanism isolated from 
gene~al intelligence and- moral sensitivity. 
Any such articulated behavioral modes need to be fig­
'ured back into a more generalized intelligence. Those who 
advocate evolutionary psychology need to integrate many 
disciplines: evolutionary biology, cognitive science, behav­
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ioral ecology, psychology, hunter-gatherer studies, social an­
thropology, biological anthropology, primatology, and 
neurobiology. These are not disciplines in which one be­
comes expert by behavioral mechanisms using a S"riss-army­
knife mind. Educators, whether scientists or humanists, need 
broadly analytical and synoptic minds. Evolutionary psy­
chologists seem to be arguing that we can and ought be able 
to re-adapt by critical thought these adapted minds we 
inherit. 
In overall assessment, many conclude that humans live 
under what Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson call "a dual 
inheritance system" (1985). Humans have some dispositions 
to which they are genetically disposed, and other dispositions 
into which they are culturally educated. Their actual behav­
ior is an interactive resultant. Human behaviors fall within 
an ellipse with two foci, one genetic and one cultural, and, 
depending on where one is within the ellipse, behaviors may 
be dominantly under the pull ofgenes, or culture, or various 
hybrids with components ofboth. In the "leashing" analogy, 
the leashing can be of culture by nature, or nature by culture, 
or each keeping the other leashed with various lengths of 
leash. 
How individuals behave in fact is often determined by 
their learning ~periences, or by social trends. Choices de­
pend on parents, teachers,' peers, advertising pressures, fads 
and fashions, social policies and institutions. Even in behav­
iors regarding biological reproduction, cultural beliefs can 
override any genetic dispositions to maximize offspring. 
L. L. Cavalli-Sforza and M. W. Feldman (1981) show that 
fertility has declined in Europe in the last century, and that 
Italian women, for example, do not maximize their offspring, 
differing in their beliefs and behavior from their mothers and 
grandmothers. The fertility rate per womaIl: in the United 
States fell from 7 in 1800 to 2.1 in 1990, in a period in which 
resources rose at a rate matching the fall in fertility. The rea­
sons for the changes must be cultural, not genetic. 
Richard C. Lewontin, a Harvard biologist, concludes: 
"The genes, in making possible the development of human 
'consciousness, have surrendered their power both to deter­
mine the individual and its environment. They have been re­
placed by an entirely new level ofcausation, that ofsocial in­
teraction with its own laws and its own nature" (1991, 
p. 123). Marshall Sahlins, an anthropologist, concludes: "Bi­
ology, while it is an absolutely necessary condition for cul­
ture, is equally and absolutely insufficient: it is completely 
unable to specify the cultural properties of human behavior 
or their variations from one human group to another" (1976, 
p. xi). Biology determines some outcomes but underdeter­
mines many others. 
Sociobiologists claim to give a scientific account of the 
"human qualities . . . insofar as they appear to be general 
traits of the species," the human "biogram" (Wilson, 1975, 
p. 548). Likewise, the evolutionary psychologists, though 
distancing themselves from too simplistic a genetic determi­
nation of culture, are hoping for "universal mechanisms" in 
the plural behavioral routines of their "adapted mind." Ex­
planations should be based on "the underlying level of uni­
versal evolved aichitecture. . . . One observes variable man­
ifest psychologies or behaviors between individuals and 
across cultures and views them as the product of a common, 
underlying evolved psychology, operating under different 
circumstances" (Barkow, Cosmides, and T ooby, 1992, 
p.45). ' 
Kenneth Bock complains: "Human culture histories 
here emerge as fortuitous meanderings of people within 
bounds set by a human nature produced by organic evolu­
tion" (Bock, 1980, p. 118). Blacks were slaves in the south­
ern United States and freed in 1863 during the Civil War. 
Long segregated, in the second half of the twentieth century 
they became quite integrated into American life, and the 
great-grandchildren ofslaves became legislators, mayors, col­
lege presidents, and military generals. A generic theory com­
mon to all Homo sapiens cannot explain the struggle from 
slavery to freedom by applying a universal theory to variant 
initial cultu~al conditions. The allegedly universal explana­
tion is not robust enough to tell the particular critical stories 
of the exodus from slavery to freedom. The critical difference 
lies in the historically emergent ethical conviction that slav­
ery is wrong and freedom is right, and that blacks are, in 
morally relevant respects, to be given equal opportunities and 
responsibilities with whites. 
These newfound convictions have little to do with self­
ish genes or instinctive adaptive mechanisms. Persons with 
essentially the same genetic makeup are being converted 
from one ethic to the other. The biological theory is not ex­
plaining this cultural development. 
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